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Abstract: 
Essential properties are usually thought as properties that things must always 
possess, whereas accidental properties are considered as changeable. In this 
paper, we challenge this traditional view. We argue that in some important 
cases, such as social or biological development, we face not only the change of 
accidents, but also the change of essences. To analyze this kind of change we 
propose an alternative view on the relations between the modalities and time. 
Some properties might be necessary or possible for a thing in a classical sense 
throughout its existence, whereas others might be necessary or possible only 
for some restricted periods. We distinguish therefore absolute, prospective, 
retrospective, and relative modalities. As we argue, these non-classical 
concepts of modality are useful in analysis of some puzzling case of seemingly 
changing essences.  
Keywords: essentialism, modality, necessity, essential change. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Usually essences are thought to be necessary and thus unchangeable. Essential properties of things 
are considered to be properties that things must possess, whereas accidental properties might or 
might not be possessed. The modal status of properties entails their relation to time. Necessary 
properties are properties that things always have, whereas contingent properties might change over 
time. Things can gain some new accidents, and can lose some old ones, but their essences remain 
the same. We would like to challenge this traditional view. We believe that in some cases it is 
possible to speak not only about changing accidents, but also about changing essences. It seems that 
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in such phenomena as development or decline things might change their modal properties. 
Something that was possible in one stage of a process might become impossible in another, and 
conversely, something necessary at one time might turn out to be contingent in another. In other 
words, in some cases essences might turn into accidents and accidents might become essences. The 
standard view on the relations between essences, modalities, and time, which excludes such 
transformation, should therefore be revised. 
It is clear that the classical concept of essence involves permanence in time. Though 
Aristotle’s notorious expression denoting essence to ti en einai literally means “the what it was to 
be”, it was generally understood as “the what it is to be”, where “is” was thought to be timeless 
[14]. Essence was therefore traditionally thought as a property or properties belonging to a thing 
during all its existence. If P is essential property of x, then x cannot gain and lose P, but must 
possess it all the time it exists. The opposite, however, does not hold. Some accidents might belong 
to a thing for all its time, but this does not make them essences. Porphyry in his commentary on 
Aristotle’s Categories gave famous examples: being black, for ravens, and risibility, for a human 
being [16, p. 12]. These properties, according to classical view, were not essential, even if were 
possessed by ravens and man throughout their whole life. Permanence was therefore thought as 
necessary, though not sufficient condition of essentiality.  
This kind of link between essentiality and permanence has been strengthened by modern 
modalism, that is a view connecting essentiality with necessity. In this account essential properties 
are identified with those which are necessary for an object. The concept of necessity even more 
overtly involves permanence. If P is necessary property of x, then obviously x possesses it whenever 
exists. Modalism has been famously criticized by Kit Fine [8]. He argued that necessity and 
essentiality differ not only in their intension, but also extensionally: there are necessary properties 
which can hardly be recognized as essential ones. Mathematical necessary truths for instance are 
formally entailed by the existence of Socrates, but do not constitute his essence in any reasonable 
sense. Nevertheless, Fine and his followers, though argued that necessity is not a sufficient 
condition of essentiality, have never doubted that it is its necessary condition (see [8, p. 4]; [22, p. 
211]. Being necessary does not entail being essential, but essentiality entails necessity. Since 
classical necessity entails permanence in time, it means again that essences are permanent.  
Indeed, it seems plausible that permanent or necessary (in classical sense) properties of 
things are not always essential for them. The dogma, which we want to challenge here, however 
says the opposite, namely that essential properties are always permanent or necessary (in classical 
sense). This claim seems to be shared by all debating parties. We believe that the criticism of the 
modalism should be extended. Modalism claims that classical necessity is both sufficient and 
necessary condition of essentiality. It critics argued that it is not sufficient, we believe that it is also 
unnecessary. In our view, the concept of essence might involve many different kinds of necessity, 
not the classical one. Loosening of the link between essence and necessity makes a space for the 
concept of changing nature. Therefore, in this paper we would like to sketch a conceptual 
framework for new combinations of essentiality and time. We would like to distinguish a few 
possible concepts of essences. Some properties might be necessary for a thing throughout its 
existence, whereas others might be necessary only for some periods. Thus, apart from classical 
absolute essences there are also non-classical time-relative types. It seems that the traditional view 
is only a particular case of a more general and more dynamic stance. It turns out that the concept of 
essence might be connected with many different concepts of necessity. The classical necessity, i.e. 
entailing permanence, is not necessary for being essential. It is not only insufficient, as was argued 
by critics of modalism, but also unnecessary condition for essentiality.  
First, in Section 2, we would like to point out some puzzling examples from various fields, 
which highlight the need to reconsider the standard view on essences. The simplest case is taken 
from sociology; more complicated cases are borrowed from theology and biology. All these case 
pose obvious difficulties for a classical views which do not allow changing essences. These 
examples, as we argue, cannot be also easily discussed in a simple framework of possible worlds. 
Second, in order to analyze these puzzling cases, we distinguish in Sections 3 and 4 four concepts 
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of modality: absolute, prospective, retrospective, and relative, which lead to various concepts of 
essence. We define these concepts using a logical framework generally inspired by a branching 
approach to time and modality (see [21], [13] for general overview). We do not however stick to 
any particular version of this well-developed theory. Rather, we use some of its concepts and 
intuitions to construct a very simple framework needed to our purposes. Finally, in Section 5, we 
attempt to use that framework to interpret non-classical cases discussed in Section 2. We believe 
that the proposed temporal extension of classical essentialism might help in clarifying intuitions 
concerning modalities changing over time.  
 
2. Three Modal Puzzles 
 
Now we would like to introduce a few examples that show that in some cases it is plausible to speak 
about changing essences. Things can undergo deep ontological changes, which are much more 
radical than simple accidental modification, but this does not lead to the destruction of these things. 
This kind of change is neglected in the classical view. 
 
2.1. Internalization 
 
The first and the simplest example comes from sociology. Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann 
investigated the complex process of the construction of social reality. Briefly, it consists of three 
fundamental stages: externalization, objectification, and internalization. People constantly define 
their own reality, afterwards treat it as independent, and finally transmit it to their children. The way 
people act is fundamentally contingent. We could choose, fix, and transmit completely different 
ways of behaving. Nevertheless, in the process of internalization the results of occasional human 
activity obtain the independent status of inevitability: 
 
The child does not internalize the world . . . as one of many possible worlds. He 
internalizes it as the world, the only existent and only conceivable world, the world tout 
court. . . . Primary socialization thus accomplishes what (in hindsight, of course) may be 
seen as the most important confidence trick that society plays on the individual – to 
make appear as necessity what is in fact a bundle of contingencies [3, pp. 154-5]. 
 
In other words, in the process of internalization some accidental and external characteristics, such as 
those that are default ways of acting in a given society, become essential and internal for 
individuals. If we were born and brought up in a different society, we would think and act in 
different ways, but once we successfully pass through the process of primary internalization in a 
determined society, we treat some particular ways of thinking and acting as fairly natural and in fact 
necessary. 
Berger and Luckmann argue that primary socialization is in principle irreversible. The world 
internalized in this process is so deeply entrenched in consciousness that one cannot simply 
abandon it or distance oneself from it: 
 
Our analysis suggests that such distance is only possible with regard to realities 
internalized in secondary socialization. If it extends to the realities internalized in 
primary socialization, we are in the domain of what American psychiatry calls 
“psychopathy,” which implies a deficient formation of identity [3, p. 230]. 
 
This means that the image of the world received in early childhood constitutes the very essence of 
human identity. The results of secondary socialization in school or a place of work are perceived as 
much more accidental. One can learn new things or change social roles without undermining one’s 
fundamental sense of reality. 
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This sociological example of changing essence differs from classical cases, not only – as we 
suggested – because the essence changes in this case, but also because it is somehow subjective. 
Social reality depends on the definitions accepted by the members of a society. To be real in a 
social world is to be taken as real. Moreover, the loss of acquired essence does not literally lead to 
the cessation of the individual existence. The loss of the primary image of the world presumably 
leads to psychopathy, but not necessarily to suicide. This is the exact the point of difference 
between the sociological example and the two following cases taken from theology and biology, 
where essences are thought to be perfectly objective.  
 
2. 2. Augustine 
 
The second example is the most ancient and venerable, since it comes from St Augustine. He 
suggests in a few passages that the religious development of humankind, starting with creation of 
human beings and ending in their salvation, might be seen as a series of transformations of human 
nature. In the first place, humankind in Eden could do things that would be impossible for them in 
the final stage, in heaven. Augustine writes:  
 
The first freedom of the will was therefore to be able not to sin; the final freedom will 
be much greater: not to be able to sin. The first immortality was to be able not to die; the 
final immortality will be much greater: not to be able to die. The first power of 
perseverance was to be able not to abandon the good; the final happiness of 
perseverance will be not to be able to abandon the good. The final goods will be better 
and more powerful [1, p. 214]. 
 
According to Augustine, at the beginning of creation human beings could sin or not sin (posse 
peccare et posse non peccare), whereas at the end of salvation humankind will not be able to sin 
(non posse peccare). 
Augustine used this idea of modal transformation to clarify the sense of the Fall and the 
Redemption. Due to Adam’s original sin humankind lost the possibility of not sinning (posse non 
peccare) and was left with the mere possibility of sinning (posse peccare). After the Fall human 
beings could not not sin. The Redemption fortunately restored this corrupted human nature. Due to 
Christ’s actions, human beings again acquired the possibility of not sinning (posse non peccare). 
Finally, our future Salvation will consist in the last irreversible modal change, which will exclude 
the possibility of sin [1, pp. 213-5]. 
Regardless of the subtlety of these theological matters, it seems that, for Augustine, human 
nature is substantially changeable. It allowed some possibilities at first that afterwards were 
apparently excluded. The essence of a human being was therefore thought to be dynamic, not static. 
This view obviously calls for a revision of the classical concept of essence. 
 
2.3. Jellyfish 
 
A similar example of a changing nature might be found in biology. We would like to focus on the 
lifecycle of a jellyfish. Most jellyfish start their existence in a larval form, after some time transform 
into a stationary polyp, and later undergo the final transformation, which results in an adult medusa. 
Such a description suggests the presence of some modal properties. First, it seems that a jellyfish 
has to possess the property of “being a larva” for some time at the beginning of its life. Second, it is 
possible for a jellyfish to stop being a larva, while still continuing its existence as a polyp and, after 
some time spent in a polyp stage, it is also possible for it to stop being a polyp and become an adult 
medusa. Third, after reaching the adult stage it is no longer possible for a jellyfish to stop being an 
adult medusa and yet continue its existence. 
However, there are exceptions form the above “standard” pattern: 
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[A] unique case of ontogeny reversal has been reported by Bavestrello et al. (1992), in 
which newly released, sexually immature medusae of Turritopsis nutricula McCrady, 
1859, regressed, settled onto a substrate, and gave rise to stolons and hydroid colonies 
[15, p. 302].  
 
It turns out that exemplars of Turritopsis nutricula jellyfish are able to return to the polyp stage 
even after reaching adulthood. Because the cycle of being an adult medusa and reverting to a polyp 
can – at least in some perfect environmental conditions – go on ad infinitum, the Turritopsis 
nutricula jellyfish does not have a limited life span. Within this peculiar life cycle it is no longer 
impossible to continue existence despite losing the property of being an adult medusa, due to the 
fact that existence may be continued in a form of a polyp. 
This biological example shows that variations in modal properties occur both within the life 
cycle of a single jellyfish and between the life cycles of jellyfish belonging to different species. 
Jellyfish with “standard” life cycles may acquire the modal property of being an adult medusa, 
which then cannot be lost as long as the jellyfish lives. Because of this, their modal properties can 
change during their lifetime. The property of being an adult medusa does not have the same modal 
status in the life cycle of Turritopsis nutricula, as these jellyfish can live after losing this property. 
Because of this, we may speak about modal differences between the life cycles of various species. 
Modal properties like “being a larva”, “being a polyp”, and “being an adult medusa” seems to be 
good candidates for essential properties as they determine what an entity is at different stages of its 
development [6], [7]. However, their status cannot be characterized within a theory that only allows 
for essential properties that have to be possessed at all moments of an object’s existence. 
Now, it seems that all these examples challenge the classical essentialism. Apparently in 
some cases things can change their essences. During the process of ontological development things 
lose some former possibilities and gain new ones. As we saw, this process might be either 
irreversible, as in the cases of primary socialization, final salvation, and adultness of ordinary 
jellyfish, or reversible, as in the cases of secondary socialization, original sin, and becoming an 
adult Turritopsis nutricula. These processes can hardly be described as merely accidental changes. 
We find it perfectly plausible to say that these things change their modal properties, so they also 
change their essences. Something that was possible or necessary at one stage becomes necessary or 
possible in another. This is exactly what might be called a change of essence. 
 
3. Four Kinds of Modal Properties 
 
Now we would like to sketch a general conceptual framework for expressing the modal intuition of 
dynamic essences. First of all we would like to generalize the previous puzzling examples and 
distinguish a few kinds of modal properties. Because of that, in the next section, we shall propose a 
conceptual scheme inspired by a branching approach to time. 
Let us consider some episodes from the life of the entity named “Kant”. The existence of 
Kant started at a moment t0. At that time Kant was identical to an embryo and so did not possess a 
brain. However, this situation only lasted until a later moment tA, at which Kant developed a human 
nervous system. Let us focus first on two of Kant’s properties: the property of having a brain and 
the property of being an embryo. 
Having a brain can plausibly be considered an essential property of Kant. First, after 
moment tA one important answer to the question “What is Kant?” consists in stating that Kant is a 
brain-possessing creature. Second, having a brain determines much of the Kant’s other properties, 
and facts about Kant’s brain may be used in explaining his actions [5]. Third, and the most 
important, having a brain seems to involve some modal aspect. While Kant does not possess brain 
at every period of his life, after moment tA it is impossible for Kant to lose his brain without ceasing 
to exist (it is a so-called “phasal property”; see [2], [10]). 
Being an embryo also seems to be an essential property of Kant (see [6, p. 188] for a similar 
example). It also determines what Kant was in the early stages of his development. Similarly to the 
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case of having a brain, being an embryo is not a characteristic that Kant possessed for his whole 
life: at a certain moment tB Kant lost this property. Despite this, the property of being an embryo 
also possesses a modal component. It seems that at moments earlier than tB it was impossible for 
Kant to not be an embryo. 
These two examples suggest that Kant both gained and lost essential properties during his 
lifetime: at tA he gained the property of having a brain, while at tB he lost the property of being an 
embryo. We may also consider other properties, which could be possessed for some time and in 
some broad sense might be called essential. For instance, being a philosopher is neither a property 
that Kant had at all moment of his life, nor a property that could not be lost after obtaining it. In 
such a case, is there a sense in which being a philosopher may be an essential, and so a necessary 
property of Kant? We may imagine that for Kant being a philosopher, a property gained by him at 
some moment tC, was a deeply internalized aspect of his personality, which could not be lost in a 
short period of time, but only due to a lengthy process in which Kant’s personality would be 
gradually transformed (see [19] for a similar intuition). If this is right, then we can state that it 
would have been impossible for Kant to stop being a philosopher during a certain, finite period of 
time after tC. In other words, all temporally shorter ways of losing the property of being a 
philosopher would have led to the end of Kant’s existence. 
Of course, apart from the above three peculiar kinds of essential properties that can be 
gained or lost (or both) in time, Kant may be also described as possessing more standard ones. 
Probably being a homo sapiens serves as a plausible example of an essential property that Kant 
possessed at every moment of his existence, which he could not exist without. 
It seems therefore that there are different types of essential properties, some of which may 
be gained or lost during the life history of an object. All these essential properties involve a modal 
component, since it may be stated that they are in some way necessary for an object that possess 
them.  
It should be noted that the further considerations do not rely on our accepting the story about 
Kant as entirely true. One may doubt whether Kant really existed before the development of his 
brain or whether it is possible to internalize the role of philosopher so strongly that it cannot be 
rapidly lost. What is important is to observe that somebody may rationally accept the above story 
about Kant and his essential properties. Thus, we need a theory to explain the meaning of 
statements attributing different types of essentiality, and so different types of necessity, to Kant’s 
properties.  
Of course, one may simply reject the above problem by stating that the properties that an 
object cannot lose but can lack at some periods of its life, like “having a brain”, are not necessary 
properties and so are not essential [18]. From this perspective only properties that an object cannot 
lack, like “being a homo sapiens”, deserve the status of being essential. While such position is 
internally coherent, we believe that it is misguided from a methodological point of view. According 
to our pre-theoretical intuitions objects may have some special properties that determine what a 
given object is and are such that object in some sense “has to” possess them. These properties may 
be called “essential” and the role of a philosophical theory is to explain more precisely what the 
essentiality of properties means in accordance with basic intuitions. It seems to us that properties 
like “having a brain” in the story about Kant can be intuitively regarded as essential. 
 
4. Modal Histories Framework 
 
Now we would like to propose a simple formal framework for dynamic essences. First, we will 
introduce two sets – one representing time, and one representing qualities – then we shall combine 
them to arrive at the concept of a modal history of an object, which serves as a basis for further 
definitions of various kinds of necessities determining different types of essential properties. 
The first set, T = {…, t0, t1, …}, is an infinite set of moments linearly ordered by the 
asymmetric (and so irreflexive) but transitive relation is later than. In addition, moments ti and tk are 
successors iff tk is later than ti, but there is no moment later than ti and earlier than tk. 
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The second set, Q = {A, B, C,…}, is a nonempty set whose elements are maximal sets of 
properties (MSP), excluding properties concerning an object’s existence at a particular moment 
(e.g., “exists at t1”). A set of properties is maximal if and only if for any property F, either F or ~F 
belongs to the set. 
A Cartesian product Q × T is a nonempty set of MSP at times: QT = {…,<A,t1>, <B,t2>,…}. 
Now, by referring to the set QT, the crucial notion of the proposed framework, modal history of an 
object x, may be characterized. 
The modal history of an object x, MH(x), is a structure composed of MSP at times, 
containing all MSP at times that x can have during its existence and only those MSP at times. For 
example, if <A, t1> does not belong to the MH(x), then the entity x cannot exist at moment t1 in a 
way characterized by A. Further, in the context of modal histories MSP at times will be called 
points of a modal history. 
Because a modal history is a structure, there is a relation organizing the points of a modal 
history. More precisely, a relation is needed that describes how the properties of an object can 
change in subsequent moments. This relation cannot simply be the is later than relation connecting 
moments, as in this case all points containing earlier moments would be connected with all points 
that contain later moments. Such a solution wrongly excludes modal histories which, for example, 
includes points <A, t1>, <B, t1>, and <C, t2>, but in which an object can be as it is characterized by 
C at t2 only if at the previous moment it possessed properties included in A (and not those included 
in B). 
We propose the introduction of an asymmetric and intransitive relation of modal binding 
that may connect points containing subsequent moments. If some points <A, t1> and <B, t2> stand 
in such a relations, it means that if an object possesses A-properties at t1, then at t2 it can possess B-
properties. What is more, we may define that a point k of a modal history is in the asymmetric and 
transitive relation of being further (<) than point g of this modal history iff there is a chain of 
modally bounded points whose first element is g and last is k. If one point is further than another, 
then there is a pattern of changes that can lead from properties possessed at the earlier point to 
properties possessed at the further point. 
A modal history can have a branching shape. Let us consider a very simple example of such 
a history (lines represent modal binding relations) (Fig. 1): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
According to the above diagram, an object can only exist at two moments: t1 and a successive 
moment t2. At moment t1 it can exist if and only if it has properties belonging to the maximal set A. 
However, at t2 it can exist in two different ways: having properties belonging to the maximal set B 
or having properties belonging to the maximal set C. 
Up to this point, the framework of modal histories may seem analogous to models of 
branching-time, which describe tree-like structures composed of moments ordered by a is later than 
relation [21], [13]. Indeed, similarly to the branching-time approach, the properties of the R relation 
and the ordering of moments in the set T forbid backward structures (e.g., in which t1 is later than 
t2) and reflexive structures (e.g., in which t2 is later from itself). 
However, branching-time models usually put additional restrictions on the permitted 
structures. Most notably, in standard branching models structures can branch only towards the 
future, but not into the past. More formally, it is assumed that if tk is later than ti and tk is later than 
tj, then ti=tj or tj is later than ti, or ti is later than tj. Because of this, the structures described in 
branching-time models may intuitively be called “tree-like”, or described as possessing many 
“branches” resulting from a single “trunk”. However, if we look for a framework describing the 
Fig. 1 A simple branching modal history. 
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ways in which an object can be at earlier and later moments, an analogous constraint should not be 
postulated in the case of modal histories. Let us consider another very simple modal history (Fig. 2): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
According to that diagram, an object at t1 can exist as having properties belonging to the maximal 
set A or as having properties belonging to the maximal set B. However, in the successive moment t2 
it can exist only as having properties belonging to the maximal set C. The presence of such “modal 
bottlenecks” cannot be a priori rejected; in fact they may be quite popular, and so modal histories 
that branch towards the past should be permitted. Metaphorically speaking, modal histories often do 
not resemble well-groomed trees, but rather the rhizomes beloved of postmodern thinkers. 
In addition, in the characterization of modal histories it is not even assumed that for any two 
points of the history, g1 and g2, it is the case that g1<g2 or g2<g1. In other words, a single modal 
history may be composed of unconnected “branches”. Let us consider a simple modal history once 
more (Fig. 3): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An object with the modal history illustrated by the above diagram can exist at t1 as having 
properties belonging to the maximal set A or as having properties belonging to the maximal set B. 
What is more, at t2 it can exist as having properties belonging to the maximal set B or as having 
properties belonging to the maximal set C. However, if it has properties belonging to the maximal 
set A at t1, than at t2 it can only has properties belonging to the maximal set C, and if at t1 it has 
properties belonging to the maximal set B, then at t2 it can only have properties belonging to the 
maximal set D. Again, it seems that there is no a priori reason to exclude objects with such modal 
histories and so histories composed of unconnected branches should be allowed (see [5, pp. 121-23] 
and the criticism in [11]). 
Having characterized the notion of a modal history of an object x, we may now show how it 
can be used in explaining the difference in modal status of Kant’s various essential properties. The 
framework of modal histories allows us to express various intuitively true modal statements 
concerning Kant. For example, it seems plausible that it would have been possible for Kant to start 
his life with properties different to those that he actually possessed. In such a case, in Kant’s modal 
history there would be at least two minimal points that have the same moment but different MSP 
(see Fig. 2). 
Some more extravagant modal claims concerning Kant correspond to some structures of 
modal histories. For instance, one may claim that it was possible for Kant to have been born in 
Berlin and that in this case his life would have been completely different (he was actually born in 
Königsberg). If this is the case, then Kant’s modal history is composed of at least two unconnected 
branches (see Fig. 3). The minimal point of one of these branches has MSP with “being born in 
Berlin” as its element, while the minimal point of the second one has MSP with “being born in 
Königsberg. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2 A modal history that branches 
towards the past. 
Fig. 3 A modal history compose of two 
unconnected branches. 
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4. 1. Absolute Necessity 
 
Let us now consider how the framework of modal histories may help in explicating statements 
concerning the necessity of essential properties. We start with a classical concept of necessity, then 
we shall define non-classical cases. The classical, absolute concept would be referred to as □, the 
“absolute necessity”. 
As stated above, “being a homo sapiens” seems to be an essential property of Kant. What is 
more, this property was possessed by Kant at every moment of his life and it was impossible for 
him to exist while lacking this property. In terms of a modal histories framework it can be stated 
that at each point of Kant’s modal history “being a homo sapiens” belongs to MSP related to that 
point, or simpler, that at each point of his modal history Kant possesses “being a homo sapiens”. 
Because Kant’s modal history contains all “MSP at times” that Kant could have during his 
existence, the above statement expresses the idea that there would have been no possibility of Kant 
existing without being a homo sapiens. 
This type of necessity can be called “absolute necessity” and defined as follows: 
 
(D1)  At any point gi belonging modal history of an object x (MH(x)) it is absolutely necessary for 
an object x to possess a property F (□) iff at every point belonging to MH(x) the object x 
possesses F. 
 
∀	
∈	□ ↔ ∀	∈	 
 
Analogously, the notion of “absolute possibility” may be defined by stating that at some point it is 
absolutely possible for an object to posses F if and only it has F at some point of its modal history: 
 
(D2)  At any point gi belonging MH(x) it is absolutely possible for an object x to possess property 
F (⋄ 	) iff there is a point belonging to MH(x) that x possesses F at this point. 
 
 ∀	
∈	⋄  ↔ ∃	∈	 
 
As it is easy to see, by considering the above definitions, that if at some point of a modal history it 
is absolutely necessary for an object to possess F, then at this point it is also absolutely possible for 
an object to possess F. What is more, if at some point it is absolutely necessary for an object to 
possess F, then at every point of its modal history it is absolutely necessary to possess F. The same 
goes for absolute possibility: if it is absolutely possible to possess F at some point, then at all points 
it is absolutely possible to possess F. 
In the case of Kant’s modal history, at each point Kant possesses “being a homo sapiens” 
and so at each point it is absolutely necessary for him (and so also absolutely possible) to be a homo 
sapiens. Now we can easily see that the necessity of another of Kant’s essential properties, “having 
a brain”, cannot be absolute necessity. It is not the case that Kant possesses “having a brain” at 
every point of his modal history, since at some points, at least those corresponding to the actual 
early phase of his development, he lacks this attribute. 
 
4.2. Prospective Necessity 
 
There were some moments in the actual life of Kant at which he did not have a brain. What is more, 
there are possible histories of Kant’s life in which his life ended very early such that he did not have 
a brain at all. The necessity of “having a brain” for Kant arises from the fact that after developing a 
brain it is no longer possible for Kant to lose a brain and continue to exist. While there may be 
problems with characterizing such necessity in terms of possible worlds, it can easily be done 
within the framework of modal histories. Kant possesses a brain in a necessary way at some point of 
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his modal history, because at every further point he possesses the property of having a brain. This 
type of necessity can be called “prospective necessity” and defined as follows: 
 
(D3)  At any point gi belonging to MH(x) it is prospectively necessary for x to have a property F 
(□→	) iff for every gk belonging to MH(x), if gk is further than gi, then object x possesses F at 
gk.  
 
∀	
∈ 	□→	 ↔ ∀	∈	 <  →   
 
The notion of prospective necessity is a counterpart of the temporal logic operator G (“It will 
always be the case that …”, [17, p. 13]), where Gp is true at some moment if and only if p is true 
at all later moments. 
Analogously, a notion of “prospective possibility” can be defined: 
 
(D4)  At any point gi belonging to MH(x) it is prospectively possible for x to have a property F 
(⋄→ ) iff there is gk belonging to MH(x) such that gk is further than gi and object x possesses F 
at gk.  
 
∀	
∈ 	⋄→  ↔ ∃	∈	 <  ∧   
 
The above definitions entail that prospective possibility follows from prospective necessity.1 In 
addition, if at some point it is prospectively necessary for an object to have F, then also it is 
prospectively necessary to have F at all further points. 
If our modal intuitions about “having a brain” and Kant are correct, then in the modal 
history of Kant there is a point at which it is prospectively necessary, but not absolutely necessary, 
for him to have a brain. In fact, a stronger statement also seems plausible: that “having a brain” 
cannot be possessed by Kant in any weaker sense than that specified by prospective necessity. 
Speaking more precisely, if at some point gi belonging to Kant’s modal history Kant possesses 
“having a brain”, then at gi it is prospectively necessary for Kant to possess “having a brain”. 
Perhaps there are more properties like having a brain, properties of which it is true that if they are 
possessed, they are possessed prospectively necessarily. 
The notion of prospective necessity is weaker than absolute necessity. If at some point it is 
absolutely necessary to possess F, then at this point it is prospectively necessary to possess F, but 
not conversely. Because of this, at some points of Kant’s modal history it can be prospectively 
necessary for him to possess a brain, while it may still be true that he does not have a brain at every 
point. While there is a form of necessity connected with the property of having a brain, it is a 
different type to that exemplified by the absolutely necessary “being a homo sapiens”. “Having a 
brain” is a candidate for an essential property that can be gained during an object’s history: an 
object cannot lose it, but it can lack this property at some points of its existence. 
One may ask, whether the notion of prospective necessity, and subsequent notions of 
retrospective and relative necessities, can be expressed in the more usual framework of possible 
worlds. We believe that it can be done, in a certain version of such framework, but we prefer to use 
the proposed modal histories framework as it seems to rests on weaker assumptions. If a necessary 
property of an object is defined as a property that on object has in all possible worlds in which it 
exists [20], [23], then the notion of prospective necessity cannot be formulated. This point can be 
demonstrated by considering the property of having a brain. Unfortunately, it is not the case that 
Kant has a brain at some moment in every possible world in which he exists, because in some 
possible worlds he died in the very early stages of development. What is more, a weaker statement, 
according to which in each possible world where Kant exists longer than X there is a moment in 
which he has a brain, is also not true. It seems to be logically – and probably also physically – 
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possible to prolong the early brainless stage of Kant’s development for an indefinite amount of 
time. 
A more promising idea is to develop a “two-dimensional” possible worlds framework, in 
which properties are possessed not just in a given world but in a world at a given time. Then, it can 
be stated that a property F of an object x is prospectively necessary if and only if for every moment t 
in every world in which x exists, x has F at every moment later than t. However, such solution has 
an important drawback. The crucial idea of our paper is that an object can change its nature by 
changing the modal status of its properties. Unfortunately, the above solution does not leave a space 
for expressing that, for example, a property F is merely contingent for an object x at one moment 
but then starts to be prospectively necessary. It is so because while the definition of F’s prospective 
necessity involves time it is not a definition of F’s being prospectively necessary at a particular 
time. 
To amend this problem another modification of possible worlds framework is needed, which 
introduces trans-world moments and an accessibility relation that connects certain worlds-times 
pairs (analogous to our “modal binding”). If some moments, like tm and tn where tn is earlier than tm, 
can belong to many possible worlds, then it can be stated that F is prospectively necessary for x at tm 
in world W because in every possible world, accessible from tm in world W, in which x and tm exists, 
x has F at all moments later than tm. Despite that F may be contingent for x at tn in world W due to 
the fact that not in all worlds, accessible from tn in world W, in which x and tn exist, F is possessed 
by x at all moments later than tn. From this perspective, every maximal branch of a modal history of 
x may be identified with a set of possible worlds which do not differ in respect of x’s properties 
through time. However, such possible worlds framework assumes not only the possibility of 
identifying objects between possible worlds, which is problematic on its own grounds, but also the 
possibility of moments trans-world identification. The possible histories framework developed in 
this paper does not need any of these and utilizes only an intuitive idea that an object’s lifetime 
could have been different from the actual one.  
 
4.3. Retrospective Necessity 
 
The necessity of “being an embryo” is a mirror image of the necessity connected with “having a 
brain” (at least in the context of Kant’s life). Neither of these properties was possessed by Kant at 
every moment of his actual life. However, while it was impossible for Kant to lose his brain, the 
same does not hold about the property of being an embryo. In fact, the situation is reversed: it is 
possible that Kant is an embryo at some moment ti but does not have this property at later moments; 
but is it impossible that he is not an embryo at moments earlier than ti. 
In terms of the modal histories framework, we may state that at least at some moments of 
Kant’s actual life it was “retrospectively necessary” for him to be an embryo, where retrospective 
necessity is defined as follows: 
 
(D5)  At any point gi belonging to MH(x) it is retrospectively necessary for x to have a property F 
(□←) iff for every gk belonging to MH(x), if gi is further than gk, then object x possesses F at 
gk.  
 
∀	
∈ 	□← ↔ ∀	∈	 <  →   
 
The notion of retrospective necessity is a counterpart of the temporal logic operator H (“It has 
always been the case that …”, [17, p. 32]), where Hp is true at some moment if and only if p is 
true at all earlier moments. 
Similarly to case of prospective modalities, the notion of “retrospective possibility” can be 
characterized: 
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(D6)  At any point gi belonging to MH(x) it is retrospectively possible for x to have a  property F 
(	⋄← ) iff there is gk belonging to MH(x) such that gi is further than gk and object x possesses 
F at gk.  
 
∀	
∈ 	⋄←  ↔ ∃	∈	 <  ∧   
 
Again, it can be easily noticed that retrospective necessity entails retrospective possibility.2 What is 
more, as in the case of prospective necessity, retrospective necessity is weaker than absolute 
necessity. An object can possess a property in a retrospectively necessary way at some points its 
modal history without having this property at all points. 
Going back to Kant’s modal history, we should postulate that at some points, corresponding 
to certain stages of Kant’s actual life, it was retrospectively necessary for him to be an embryo. In 
case of “having a brain” it is also plausible to assume that Kant could not possess this property 
without possessing it in a prospectively necessary way. We may ask if an analogous statement 
regarding “being an embryo” should also be accepted, i.e. whether it is true that, if at some point gi 
belonging to Kant’s modal history, Kant possesses “being an embryo”, then at gi it is retrospectively 
necessary for Kant to be an embryo. 
It seems a little less intuitive to accept the above claim than its counterpart concerning 
“having a brain”. This is because we may imagine that in some non-actual parts of Kant’s modal 
history he develops beyond the embryonic stage but then, due to some science-fiction 
nanotechnology, is reversed to the earlier phase. If such scenarios are possible, then the modal (and 
so essential) status of “being an embryo” is not uniform across Kant’s modal history and only in 
some parts of it is being an embryo possessed in a retrospectively necessary way. 
The notion of retrospective necessity designates a third type of necessity, different from both 
absolute and prospective necessities, and so may be regarded as connected with yet another type of 
essential property. Such properties do not have to be possessed at every point of an object’s modal 
history, but if they are possessed at some point, then they are possessed at all earlier points up to the 
starting moment of an object’s existence. In other words, if an essential property is necessary in a 
prospective sense, it can be gained during the object’s existence, but then cannot be lost before its 
end. Reversely, if an essential property is necessary in a retrospective sense, it can be lost during the 
object’s existence, but the object could not exist without it at earlier moments. 
 
4. 4. Relative Necessity 
 
The kind of necessity that was connected with “being a philosopher” in Kant’s life seems to be even 
weaker than prospective and retrospective necessities. The property of being a philosopher can not 
only be gained at some moment later then the starting moment of an object’s existence, but can also 
be lost before an object ceases to exist. Why then should we postulate that possessing such a 
property is necessary in any sense? It is necessary if, as is claimed in the earlier story concerning 
Kant, after gaining this property an object has to possess it for some period of time. Further, we will 
refer to this weak type of necessity as “relative necessity”. 
In terms of the modal histories framework the above idea can be expressed by stating that at 
some point an object possesses a property in a relatively necessary way if and only if it has this 
property at all further points in some range. To characterize the notion of “relative necessity” more 
precisely, we will need to define a concept of the “upper-limiting set of points of MH(x)” and 
“lower-limiting set of points of MH(x)”: 
 
(D7)  !  is a upper-limiting set of points of a MH(x) if and only if elements of  !  are all 
points of MH(x) whose second element is earlier or equal to tj (e.g. <A, tj>,  
<B, tj-1>) and only those points. 
15 
 
"#$  is a lower-limiting set of points of a MH(x) if and only if elements of "#$  are all points of 
MH(x) whose second element is later or equal to tj (e.g. <A, tj>, <B, tj+1>) and only those points. 
 
By using the notions presented in (D7), relative necessity can be defined. However, the situation is 
a bit more complicated, as there is more than one type of relative necessity. First, there is 
“prospective relative necessity”, which occurs at some point of a modal history if and only if an 
object has to possess a property up to a certain further point. Second, we can distinguish 
“retrospective relative necessity”, which occurs at some point of a modal history if and only if an 
object has to possess a property up to a certain earlier point. Third, both prospective and 
retrospective types of relative identity come in different versions connected with the temporal 
distance between a point at which it is relatively necessary to possess a property and the point up to 
which this property has to be possessed. Due to these complications we may provide two general 
definitions of “relative prospective necessity” and “relative retrospective necessity”: 
 
(D8)  At any point gi belonging to MH(x) it is relatively prospectively necessary for x to have a 
property F (□%→	) iff there is  !  such that if a point gk belongs to  !  and gk is further 
than gi, then object x possesses F at gk. 
 
∀	
∈ 	&□%→	 ↔ ∃'⊂ ) ! * ∧ ∀	 ∈ * ∧  <  → +,  
 
(D9)  At any point gi belonging to MH(x) it is relatively retrospectively necessary for x to have a 
property F (□%←	) iff there is "#$  such that if a point gk belongs to "#$  and gk is earlier 
than gi, then object x possesses F at gk. 
 
∀	
∈ 	&□%→	 ↔ ∃'⊂ )"#$ * ∧ ∀	 ∈ * ∧  >  → +,  
 
Of course, two corresponding notions of “relative prospective possibility” and “relative 
retrospective possibility” may also be defined: 
 
(D10)  At any point gi belonging to MH(x), it is relatively prospectively possible for x to have a 
property F (⋄%→ ) iff there is  !  such that there is a point gk that belongs to  !  and gk is 
further than gi and object x possesses F at gk.  
 
∀	
∈ 	&⋄%→ 	 ↔ ∃'⊂ ) ! * ∧ ∃	 ∈ * ∧  <  ∧ +,  
 
(D11)  At any point gi belonging to MH(x) it is relatively retrospectively possible for x to have a 
property F (⋄%← ) iff there is "#$  such that there is a point gk that belongs to "#$  and gk 
is earlier than gi and object x possesses F at gk. 
 
∀	
∈ 	&⋄%→ 	 ↔ ∃'⊂ )"#$ * ∧ ∃	 ∈ * ∧  >  ∧ +, 
 
Analogously, as in the case with other types of necessity, here relative possibilities are also entailed 
by respective relative necessities. What is more, the relative necessity is the weakest form of 
necessity. First, if at some point it is absolutely necessary to possess a property, then at this point it 
is both prospectively and retrospectively relatively necessary to possess this property. Second, 
possessing a property in a prospectively necessary way entails that it is possessed relatively 
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prospectively necessary. Finally, possessing a property in a retrospectively necessary way entails 
that it is possessed relatively retrospectively necessary. 
If the earlier story about Kant’s life is true, then at some points of his modal history it is 
relatively prospectively necessary for him to be a philosopher. However, it is very unlikely that at 
each point at which he is a philosopher it is relatively prospectively necessary for him to possess 
this property. In this case “being a philosopher” may be relatively necessary at some parts of Kant’s 
modal history, but at other parts this property may not be connected even with this weakest type of 
necessity. 
So far we have characterized four general variants of necessity, which may correspond with 
four distinct types of essential properties. Essential properties that are absolutely necessary are 
possessed by an object at every point of its modal history. In Kant’s case, “being a homo sapiens” 
seems to be a legitimate candidate. Prospective necessity is connected with essential properties that 
can be gained during an object’s existence, but then cannot be lost up to its end. It seems plausible 
that if Kant has a brain at some point in his modal history, then at this point it is prospectively 
necessary for him to possess a brain. Retrospective necessity is a mirror image of prospective 
necessity. It is connected with essential properties that can be lost at some point of existence, but 
nevertheless have to be possessed at all earlier moments. We argued that there are some points in 
Kant’s modal history at which “being an embryo” is for him necessary in a retrospective way. 
Finally, relative necessity designates a class of essential properties that may be gained at some point 
and then lost at a later time. Despite this, they may be characterized as necessary because they 
display a “modal inertia”. For example, in case of relative prospective necessity, they cannot be lost 
for some period of time. It may be the case that “being a philosopher” is relatively necessary for 
Kant at some points in his modal history. 
 
5. Puzzles Reconsidered 
 
Now we are ready to turn back to the examples introduced at the beginning of this paper. approach. 
We believe that the above-proposed conceptual framework may help to clarify these puzzling cases 
of dynamic essences in sociology, theology, and biology. 
 
5.1. Social Internalization 
 
The simplest case is the process of social internalization. During primary socialization a socially 
constructed image of the world becomes a part of individual identity. One cannot lose this without 
losing one’s own personal integrity. That is why in the case of internalization it can be said that 
some accidental social properties become essential for individual human beings. 
This process can be simply characterized with a help of the introduced concepts. As is clear 
from the discussion on Kant, being human involves a complex combination of different kinds of 
modalities. First of all, all humans presumably have some absolute necessary properties. Perhaps 
being a material substance or being a rational animal are examples of such properties. These 
constitute what is called ‘nature’ in classical essentialism. We might denote such absolute necessary 
properties as {□/}. 
Now, humans are, however, amazingly flexible entities. The same absolute nature might be 
joined with different cultural extensions. Thus, second, in the early stages of its, a human has many 
different prospective possibilities. A child could be raised in this or that culture, could internalize 
this or that image of the world, and could therefore act in this or that way. At the beginning the 
modal properties of humans, besides some absolute necessary properties P, also embrace many 
prospective possible properties Q: {⋄→ 1}. 
Suppose now that a child was raised in a determinate culture, and acquired its first language 
and internalized some primary world-view. After successful primary socialization, something has 
essentially changed. Now we have no more tabula rasa, but rather tabula scripta, at least partly. 
Some possibilities allowed in the first stage have been realized and now determine the modal status 
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of the individual in a new way. According to Berger and Luckmann, as quoted above, the process of 
primary socialization is irreversible. Once one acquires a social identity, one cannot lost it without a 
crisis of identity and even mental pathology. It seems therefore that this is a case of prospective 
necessity: {□→2}. 
Usually, however, the modal determination in not so all-embracing. After successful 
primary socialization a human being could choose many different forms of secondary socialization. 
A child can still become a firefighter, doctor, or philosopher, even though it cannot reverse the 
process through which it became a child of a determinate culture. These secondary social roles are 
important for one’s identity, but not in such a deep existential way as one’s primary image of the 
world. This is because they are perceived as accidental. Even the child feels that it could become 
somebody completely different. This means that a human being, after primary socialization, 
achieves a new set of prospective possibilities: {⋄→ 3}. 
The whole process of primary socialization might be therefore described as a transition from 
a one modal stage to another. It might be depicted in the following way:  
 
{□/,⋄→ 1}  {□/, □→2,⋄→ 3} 
 
The absolute essences remain unchanged; new prospective-essential properties are achieved; the 
prospective possibilities are accordingly changed. This is the same human who passed through 
primary socialization, but she acquires a new nature.  
 
5. 2. The History of Salvation 
 
Saving humankind is more complicated that raising a child. According to St. Augustine, human 
salvation does not consist in simple essentialization, as primary socialization does, but also in a 
series of modally relative essentializations and de-essentializations, which were not allowed in the 
former sociological case. Moreover, in this case we are faced with true objective modalities; 
psychological integrity is not at stake here, as in the previous case, but the very existence of an 
individual, just as in classical essentialism.  
At the beginning everything was possible, leaving aside the presupposed absolute essence of 
humankind. Humans in Eden could sin or not sin. Perhaps the first human thought that these were 
prospective modalities, but they turned out to be relative only: {⋄%→ 3,⋄%→ ¬3}.  
This modal status quo changed after the first realization of the possibility of sinning. It 
turned out that the first sin was a modal trap. After the Fall, humankind could not not sin. If that 
were the end of the story, humankind would be eternally condemned to sinning. Again, afterwards it 
turned out this was not a prospective modality, which would exclude any form of salvation, but 
only a relative one: {□%→3}, that is: {¬ ⋄%→ ¬3}.  
The Redemption was apparently a reversion of this modal essentialization. Christ’s 
resurrection restored the previous modal status of humankind. The difference between humankind 
before the Fall and humankind after the Redemption lies, however, not only in their previous 
experiences. Now humankind can again sin or not sin, but this time the realization of the possibility 
of sin does not, as it seems, lead to a modal trap. It is plausible then to replace the relative 
possibility of not sinning with prospective possibility: {⋄%→ 3,⋄→ ¬3}. After the Redemption, we 
always retain the possibility of making good things.  
The final Salvation, according to Augustine, is the exclusion of the possibility of sin. It is 
something like the inversion of the Fall. After the Fall, humankind could not not sin, whereas after 
the Salvation it cannot sin. Salvation, therefore, is an essentialization of sancticity. It seems that this 
modal shift should be thought not as relative, but as prospective: {□→¬3}, in other words: {¬ ⋄→ 3}. 
Therefore Augustine’s theological history of creation, the Fall, the Redemption, and 
Salvation of humankind is a complicated story of relative essentialization and de-essentialization of 
sins and virtues:  
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{⋄%→ 3,⋄%→ ¬3} 	{¬ ⋄%→ ¬3}  {⋄%→ 3,⋄→ ¬3}  {¬ ⋄→ 3} 
 
Its final result is the necessitation of the former mere possibility to not sin. This general process, 
however, was interrupted by the relative essentialization of sin and its prospective de-
essentialization. It seems that the proposed conceptual framework might really be adopted to clarify 
these complicated matters. 
 
5. 3. Jellyfish Life 
 
Now we can turn to the most complicated case of T. nutricula jellyfish life. The description of a 
standard jellyfish life cycle, presented by Piraino et al. [15], suggest that the life of a jellyfish 
consists in three phases, during which its essential properties change. First, a jellyfish starts its life 
as a larva and stays in this form for a certain period of time. Second, it transforms from a larva to a 
polyp and also possesses this form for some time. Finally, it changes from polyp to an adult 
medusa. This final stage lasts till the end of the organism’s life. However, the life cycle of T. 
nutricula seems to be special, since this jellyfish is able to revert from the adult stage to the polyp 
stage, and then again become an adult in a potentially infinite cycle. 
Similarly to a “standard” jellyfish, T. nutricula starts its existence in larval form. This means 
that at all the minimal points of its modal history, it possesses “being a larva”. What is more, it has 
to remain in a larval stage at a certain number of later moments. Because of this, at early points of a 
modal history, it is retrospectively necessary for T. nutricula to be a larva since it has this property 
at all earlier points up to the minimal ones. In addition, at these early points it is also relatively 
prospectively necessary to be a larva, due to the fact that this property cannot be lost for a certain 
period of time. We may state that in the early phases of life T. nutricula has the following set of 
essential properties: {□, □←6, □%→6}, where L designates “being a larva” and G symbolizes all 
absolutely necessary properties which have to be possessed by T. nutricula. 
However, it is not the case that at all points of a modal history the set of T. nutricula’s 
essential properties equals {□, □←6, □%→6}. At some distance from the minimal point of a modal 
history, there are two points gi and gk such that gk is a successor of gi (i.e., they stand in a modal 
binding relation), and at gi the jellyfish is a larva but at gk it is a polyp. Such a situation has to occur 
within a modal history if it is possible for T. nutricula to transform from the larval stage into a 
polyp. Then, at point gi it is no longer relatively prospectively necessary to be a larva, as at one of 
the successive moments the jellyfish is a polyp. Nevertheless, at gi it is still retrospectively 
necessary to be a larva, since a jellyfish is a larva at all earlier moments. Because of this, the set of 
essential properties shrinks to: {□, □←6}. 
What is more, a set of essential properties undergoes another modification as soon as T. 
nutricula becomes a polyp. As was stated above, in the modal history of T. nutricula there is a point 
gi at which the jellyfish is a larva and a successive point gk at which it possesses “being a polyp”. 
According to a biological story, a jellyfish has to be a polyp for some time after acquiring this 
property. This means that at point gk it is relatively prospectively necessary for a jellyfish to be a 
polyp. Nevertheless, at this point it is still retrospectively necessary for it to be a larva, as a jellyfish 
is a larva at all earlier points. Because of this, between gi and gk the set of essential properties 
expands to the following form: {□, □←6, □%→/}, where P designates “being a polyp”. 
The above stage is very short and the set of essential properties changes again just after 
point gk. If at gk it is relatively prospectively necessary to have “being a polyp”, then at all 
successive points a jellyfish is a polyp. However, at these points it is no longer retrospectively 
necessary for a jellyfish to be a larva, because there is an earlier point, i.e. the point gk, at which it is 
not a larva but a polyp. Due to this fact at points further than gk the set of essential properties 
shrinks again to the form {□, □%→/}. 
A jellyfish may transform once again during its lifetime, this time from a polyp to an adult 
medusa. If this is the case, then again in its modal history there is a point gm at which it is a polyp 
and a successive point gn at which it is an adult medusa. Points such as gm designate another 
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modification of essential properties. At gm it is no longer relatively prospectively necessary to be a 
polyp, due to the presence of the successive point gn. Because of this, only those properties that are 
necessary in an absolute way belong to the set of essential properties possessed at gm: {□}. 
The further modification of the set of essential properties occurs at the first point at which a 
jellyfish is an adult medusa (such as the point gn characterized above). In the case of a “standard” 
life cycle, a jellyfish has to possess the property of being an adult medusa up to the end of its life 
and so at each point at which a jellyfish possesses this property, it possesses it in a prospectively 
necessary way {□→7 } (M designates “being an adult medusa”).  
However, in the special life cycle of T. nutricula, the set of essential properties {□, □%→/} 
can shrink to {□} just before the possibility of becoming an adult medusa arises, and then, if the 
property of being an adult medusa is acquired, change to {□, □%→7}, instead of {□, □→7}, 
known from the “standard” life cycle. Further, when in a successive moment there is the possibility 
to return to the polyp stage, the set shrinks again to {□}, and then, if the reversal from the adult 
stage to the polyp stage occurs, the set is again {□, □%→/}. While it is unlikely, it is possible for 
such a cycle to repeat infinitely in the life of a particular T. nutricula. Overall, the pattern of 
changes in the essential properties within the life of a T. nutricula can be presented as a sequence of 
sets that ends with a loop: 
 
{□, □←6, □%→6} 	{□, □←6}  {□, □←6, □%→/}  {□, □%→/} 
 {□, } {	□, □%→7} 
 
The framework of modal histories used here thus makes possible an account of the changing 
essences of biological organisms. T. nutricula seems to both lose (e.g., “being a larva”) and gain 
(e.g., “being a polyp”) essential properties during its life. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this paper we attempted to combine modality and time in a new way. Traditionally modalities are 
thought to be timeless. Classical necessities and possibilities hold for any time when an individual 
exists. We believe that such approach cannot do justice to the common phenomena of development.  
Some changes really involve a modification of the modal status of a thing, but nevertheless 
do not lead to its destruction. It is, after all, the same child that was born and raised in a determinate 
culture, the same humankind that fell and was saved, and finally the same jellyfish that pass through 
all the stages of their life-cycle. All these changes involve a deep modal shift: some things that were 
possible become necessary, and vice versa. In other words, they are examples of real essential 
change. These cases, to our minds, challenge the traditional view of static essences.  
We propose dissolving the close connection between modality and time and unite them in 
new ways. We distinguished four such ways: absolute, prospective, retrospective, and relative 
modalities. Classical cases turned out to be simply extreme points of a large range of modalities. 
We tried to show that such simple modifications make possible a clarification of some puzzling real 
examples from sociology, theology, and biology.  
One common charge against classical essentialism is that it excludes the real development of 
things. Ancient static essences, it is said, are incompatible with the contemporary dynamic vision of 
the world. On the other hand, modern anti-essentialists are accused of neglecting the real modal 
constraints that determine the process of development. Clearly not everything might really become 
something else, or not always. We believe that both sides of this discussion are right and we hope 
that our investigation shows the way in which these two opposite views might be reconciled.  
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Notes 
 
                                                          
1. The maximal points of a modal history, i.e. points after which there are no further points, constitute an exception. 
According to (D3) and (D4), at maximal points everything is prospectively necessary but nothing is prospectively 
possible.  
2. The minimal points of a modal history, i.e. points that have no earlier points, constitute an exception. According to 
(D5) and (D6), at minimal points everything is retrospectively necessary but nothing is retrospectively possible. 
